Technological University Dublin

ARROW@TU Dublin
Conference papers

School of Food Science and Environmental
Health

2015

Development of the Framework for a Self-Assessment Tool to
Assess the Effectiveness of Reporting within a Safety Critical
Industry
Maria Chiara Leva
Technological University Dublin, maria.leva@tudublin.ie

Samuel Cromie
Trinity College Dublin

Ewan Douglas
Trinity College Dublin

Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/schfsehcon
Part of the Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Leva, M.C., Douglas, E. & Cromie, S. 2015. Development of the framework for a Self-Assessment Tool to
assess the effectiveness of reporting within a Safety Critical Industry. ESREL, ETH, Zurich. doi:10.13140/
RG.2.1.2141.3204

This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and
open access by the School of Food Science and
Environmental Health at ARROW@TU Dublin. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Conference papers by an
authorized administrator of ARROW@TU Dublin. For more
information, please contact arrow.admin@tudublin.ie,
aisling.coyne@tudublin.ie.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License

Development of the framework for a Self-Assessment Tool to assess the
effectiveness of reporting within a Safety Critical Industry
Ewan Douglas*, Chiara Leva, Sam Cromie, Fabio Mattei

Centre for Innovative Human Systems, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland

ABSTRACT: There is currently a large amount of literature to provide guidance on the areas that should be
considered when developing a reporting system. However there is no current methodology of monitoring the
performance and compliance of a reporting system.This paper outlines the development process for a SelfAssessment Tool (SAT) assessing the effectiveness of safety reporting within safety critical activities. The
paper outlines the need for such a self-assessment tool, the areas that will be assessed (and the rationale behind their selection), selection of the platform and finally the planned validation exercises for the paper
1 INTRODUCTION
Learning from mistakes and incidents has long
been seen as a cornerstone of safety management as
far back as the Heinrich (1941) triangle for safety
management where he shows that for each major
accident or incident there are many near misses and
unsafe conditions.
Therefore it is crucial to ensure that each and
every hazard is identified and assessed as demonstrated within the Carter and Smith (2006) statistical model for accident causation whereby an unidentified hazard will have both an unknown
severity and likelihood and therefore an unknown
risk to the organisation. In order to ensure that organisations have as many risks identified as possible, Safety Management Systems (SMS) are increasingly rolled out within organisations and more
recently becoming a regulatory requirement (Civil
Aviation Authority (UK), 2010; Edwards, 2005;
Mitchison & Papadakis, 1999; Stolzer, Halford, &
Goglia, 2010).
One of the common features of a SMS is a system of eliciting hazard reports from staff within the
organisation and using these reports to augment the
risk model within the organisation (Edwards, 2005).
Therefore a key factor in the performance of a SMS
will be the quality of data being submitted via hazard reports from staff.
There is a lot of existing literature addressing the
steps organisations should consider when rolling
out a SMS reporting system focusing on both the
cultural (Dekker & Stoop, 2012; J Reason, 1997;
James Reason, 1998, 2004) and the design and implementation of a reporting system (Lawton &
Parker, 2002; Williamsen, 2013). While this literature can provide a large amount of guidance for the
development of a reporting system, there is no unified methodology to assess a reporting system and

to provide weighting on the importance of these
factors.
Within Safety Management there are two primary approaches to reporting, Proactive and Reactive.
Proactive approaches are intended to identify risks
before they lead to a loss within the organization,
reactive approaches in comparison report after a
loss has happened with the intention of preventing a
reoccurrence of similar incidents (Johnson, 2003).
Reporting has been moving towards a proactive
approach, previous methodologies such as the
Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) (Boeing
Airplane, 2000) were focused on analysing an incident after they it occurred by providing taxonomy
for the assessment of an incident. These approaches
only produce a safety benefit after an unsafe incident has happened which is somewhat paradoxical.
Proactive techniques allow the robustness of a system to be monitored and should allow the risk assessment to be constantly updated. This approach is
also reinforced by industrial standards such as the
which require a constant review of standards. In order to maintain performance of a SMS reporting
system steps need to be taken within the organisation in order to ensure that quality reports will be
continuously submitted into a SMS. The SAT is intended to unify the existing literature into an assessment methodology, which will provide criteria
for a reporting system to be scored against and, crucially, provide a weighting on the impact of influencing criteria based on industrial case study experience.
Self-assessment tools have been previously used
within organisational human factors case studies. A
notable example can be found in Nieva and Sorra
(2003) whereby a self-assessment approach was
successfully used within a hospital environment to
provide a way of assessing the safety culture. The
self-assessment tool developed to assess safety re-

porting will look at a broader focus compared to the
safety culture assessment in Nieva and Sorra (2003)
however the concept has been used successfully
within an organisational human factors case study.
The SAT will be developed in the following
steps:
1. Identification of Criteria and Scoring
2. Prototyping and initial development
3. Industrial Feedback & Validation
The SAT is intended to be used across a variety
of different industries therefore certain sections will
have to be adapted to suit the industrial context.
The most notable of these will be the regulatory environment category. Initially the SAT will be targeted to the Biotech manufacturing and the Aerospace Maintenance Repair and Overhaul
organisations.
2 SELF ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
A review of available literature was carried out
which exposed 6 high level evaluation criteria for
the SAT which are shown in Table 1
Table 1 High Level Assessment Criteria
Evaluation
Sub Criteria
Criteria
Meeting the RequireRegulatory Requirements
ments of the Regulatory
“Good Practice”
Environment
Usability of reporting
Reporting Form Design
forms and feasibility of
Reporting Procedure
reporting Procedure
Feedback loop To Reporters
Value of Feedback for the
Provision and value of
organization
Feedback
Value of good catches to the
organization
Education and Promotion Training
of the Reporting System
Reporting Awareness
Safety Culture
Motivation
Stimulation of Reporting
External Influences from
External factors
the Industrial sector

A literature review was carried out covering the
thematic areas that were identified and shown within Table 1.
Once a high level overview of a reporting process was established the high level categories
shown in Table 1 started to emerge. Once these categories were established the literature review on the
evaluation criteria shown in Table 1was carried out
and the individual assessment criteria were developed.

In each of the categories there are a number of
statements, each of these statements will reflect the
best practise that has been identified within the literature, the assessor will then rate each of these
statements reflective of their organisation.
2.1 Meeting the Requirements of the Regulatory
Environment
The Regulatory Environment will vary depending on the industry that is being assessed. Typically
safety critical industries such as Aerospace and the
Process industry have fairly explicit regulations
governing the use of reporting systems within Safety Management. Obviously the regulatory environment will depend on the industry the SAT is being applied to; therefore initially two industrial
regulatory environments will be proposed the aerospace maintenance industry and the biotech industry
Within the aerospace industry the international
governing body of civil aviation ICAO produces a
Safety Management System manual, which calls for
a methodology to collect information from staff
with regards to incidents that can occur within the
working environment. EASA Part 145 specifically
requires for a Safety Management system that involves collecting information on incidents, near
misses and hazards within the organisation. This
requirement is reflected within the industrial best
practice, the overall industrial body looking after
the interest of international civil aviation ICAO
(2006) published a Safety Management System
Manual, which also calls for a methodology to collect information from staff with regards to incidents
that can occur within the hanger. However both the
EASA Part 145 regulations and ICAO do not provide any specific guidance on the steps that should
be implemented to stimulate reporting within an organisation and solely provide technical requirements that should be fulfilled. However regional
bodies operating under the EASA framework do
provide additional guidance material, an example of
this can be found within the United Kingdom Civil
Aviation Authority’s CAP716 publication (Civil
Aviation Authority (UK), 2006)
For the Process industry; the European Union
Seveso (E.U, 2012) directive requires for a safety
management system that incorporates near miss reporting and management. However the idea of including near misses (which may lead to an accident) in the safety management system is relatively
new.(Jones, Kirchsteiger, & Bjerke, 1999). Furthermore Seveso incorporates mandatory reporting
of accidents involving hazardous substances onto a
Europe Wide register called the MARS database.
(Major Accident Reporting System) which is a publically available database to facilitate “the exchange
of lessons learned from accidents and near misses

involving
dangerous substances” (European
Commission, 2012). Again the regulations simply
state that an organisation has to have an accident
and near miss reporting system, however there is no
direct guidance as to how organisations should set
up and monitor the a reporting system so the SAT
could provide guidance that could plug this gap in
the literature.
Regulations can also require organisations to
maintain mandatory reporting. The EASA Part 145
regulations for aerospace maintenance for instance
require organisations to perform “Mandatory Occurrence Reporting” wherein certain incidents
and/or near misses that concern airworthiness of an
aircraft (EASA, 2013) will also have to be considered in a reporting system.
The regulations provide a bare minimum level of
safety management. For instance the EASA 145
regulations requires that there is a reporting system
implemented as part of the SMS and management
are encouraged to promote safety management as
one of the pillars of safety management depicted
within the International
Civil Aviation
Organisation (2013) manual for Safety Management, however safety managers could benefit from
more concrete guidance on safety promotion and a
way to ensure that they would be compliant with
regulations. . Previous industrial experience such
as Cromie et al. (2012) shows that a lack of management involvement in a SMS can seriously affect
the performance of the SMS. While the SAT will
go considerably beyond what the regulations currently provide, due to the impact non-compliance
can pose to an organisation it would be negligent
not to consider compliance as an assessment criterion.
In addition the SAT could be extended to provide
guidance to Safety Management as to how to assess
these areas using techniques such as task modelling
as described within (Builes, Balfe, Leva, &
Douglas; Douglas, Cromie, Leva, & Balfe, 2014)
and provide a form of assessment beyond what the
regulations currently provide for.
2.2 Usability of reporting forms and feasibility of
reporting Procedure
This concerns the design of the reporting form
and the procedures surrounding reporting. There
has been previous research into design considerations for the reporting form The method of reporting was highlighted as a factor that can affect the
uptake of reporting: reporting forms that increase
the level of paperwork, do not allow the reporters to
report the details they want to report,reporting systems that are intrusive or take them away from their
day-to-day operations can all affect reporting.
(IMO, 2008; Leveson, 2011; Oltedal & McArthur,

2011). Methods like the day-to-day methodology as
described within Leva, Cahill, et al., (2010) are intending to solve this problem by providing a way of
integrating reporting in the daily operations. In this
case by developing a web based reporting system
that integrates existing paperwork requirements
with the report collection system and also provides
a benefit to staff by using the reporting data to produce a shift handover briefing automatically which
could simplify the process for staff. The reporting
method should be easily accessible, should not be
time consuming and should be designed to slipstream into their daily work practises. Kongsvik,
Fenstad, & Wendelborg, (2012) highlight that some
industries such as the maritime industry have large
levels of paperwork and are reluctant to increase the
amount of paperwork, which suggests than an approach that would utilise existing paperwork as a
method of data collection may be a good way forward. Lappalainen, Vepsäläinen, Salmi, &
Tapaninen, (2011) conducted a survey of attitudes
to reporting within the Finnish maritime industry
and found that reporting “requires excessive paperwork, and thus maritime personnel felt that the
safety management system burdens them with useless practices” (Lappalainen et al., 2011, p. 9).
Long forms, complicated procedures or insufficient
time within their workflow are also identified as a
deterrent in Evans et al., (2006).
The form design and procedure is possibly the
factor that is under the largest level of influence
from safety management. Research within industry
has commonly found that a poorly designed form
can be a significant barrier to reporting (Kongsvik,
Fenstad, & Wendelborg, 2012) and that organisations will frequently purchase commercial-off-theshelf solutions (Douglas, Leva, & Cromie, 2015)
for their safety management systems. These approaches may not be suitable for all industrial environment and can potentially pose a significant barrier to reporting when compared to bespoke
solutions that are designed with the specific industrial context in mind, an example of this can be
found within Leva, McDonald, Sordo, Righi, and
Mattei (2014) where a proactive reporting and risk
management system was implemented around existing work practises to ensure that the act of reporting does not lead to an increase in paperwork and
workload ensuring that staff have the resources to
submit reports and ultimately there will be better
data beings submitted into the SMS.
The SAT can provide a method of assessing the
design and application of a reporting system with
regards to its industrial context and to expose areas
where management will be able to augment the
SAT to improve its application within industry.

2.3 Provision and value of Feedback
The importance of adequate feedback within the
reporting culture has long been cited as an important factor for reporting. In Evans et al., (2006)
over two thirds of the interviewed hospital reporting staff had identified lack of feedback as the
greatest deterrent to reporting within the hospital.
This is also reflected by O’Leary, (2002); Reason,
(1998, 2004) which all stress the importance of
feedback within the reporting culture. Furthermore
the ISO, (2011) 31000 standard for risk assessment
stresses the importance of feedback within all levels
of the risk assessment process, reporting could form
part of that process. The presence of feedback to
reporters is a key consideration for the health of a
reporting system
Reason, (1991, 1997) highlights that organisations should keep reporters up-to-date with any actions that are taken based on reports received. Seeing that their reports are analysed and used to
actively improve safety can significantly improve
the reporting culture within an organisation.
The role of feedback to reporting was also referenced in the (Cooper, 2000) model of safety culture
using the principle of reciprocal determinism
wherein management attitudes can affect the level
of reporting, and reporters can also influence management attitudes.
Feedback can also be provided through action,
for example a member of staff submits a near miss
report citing an unsafe scaffolding, the scaffolding
is replaced quickly after the report is submitted and
crucial the reporter has seen that their report produced an improvement in safety (Johnson, 2003).
While the existing literature stresses the importance of feedback, for instance both Reason and
Johnson stress that reporting will decline significantly without a decent level of feedback; there is
little literature on how this feedback should be delivered. There has however been research into possible methods such as how to use visual feedback
such as dashboards, newsletters etc. but there is a
gap in the literature that actually looks at the effectiveness of the feedback. One of the intentions of
the case studies is to ask staff in different industries
about how they would like to see feedback and the
effectiveness of different approaches with a scope
of developing an ability to assess the suitability of
the feedback method as part of the SAT.
There is also organisation-wide feedback carried
out in some organisations (Johnson, 2003) for example a European airline publishes frequent “news
letters” (O’Leary, 2002) that provide feedback that
is seen by the whole organisation based on error reports and their subsequent investigations. This can
act as a way to stimulate reporting organisation
wide as staff will see that reports are taken serious-

ly by management. While this method may work
for a large organisation such as an airline a SME
may not simply have the numbers of incidents
and/or safety information to make a newsletter viable or enough resources to produce one. An example of news letters can be found within the Chirp
(Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting
Programme) is an aviation (since 2003) and maritime reporting programme. (CHIRP Charitable
Trust, 2007) It is an independent reporting system
for all individuals employed or associated within
these industries. The identity of reporters to CHIRP
is kept confidential, information about the report is
made accessible to the industry as freely available
feedback newsletters that are sent out to the various
industries within aerospace (Such as Commercial,
General Aviation, Maintenance) CHIP gets a good
level of response as reporters are confident it will
be confidential, and that the reports they make will
be helpful to their colleagues within their industry.
(CHIRP Charitable Trust, 2007) This reinforces the
ideas put forward in Reason (1997) in where feedback is important to encourage reporting. CHIRP is
always managed by a charity that is separate and
unrelated from the Airlines, Air Traffic Control
providers, Maintenance Providers and Regulatory
authorities, so there is no fear of ramification.
As with the design and procedure criteria, the
feedback is another area which is under the influence of management. Existing regulations and industrial standards including ISO31000 (Iso, 2009)
frequently call for feedback but provide no real
guidance as to how this should be delivered within
the organization despite how critical feedback is to
the performance of a reporting system (Evans et al.,
2006; McAfee & Winn, 1989). The SAT could
form a way for management to assess the level of
feedback they give, determine its effectiveness and
to identify ways of improving the feedback given
within the organization.
2.4 Propagation and Education of Reporting
Systems
Many organizations are stimulated to set up a reporting system either by regulatory or industrial
best practice. Leveson (2011) highlights that instructions to organizations to develop or increase
use of a reporting system are commonly found in
official reports to incidents and naturally organizations keen to prevent incidents from reoccurring
will implement a reporting system as per the investigation recommendations. However organizations
frequently fail to keep a sustained reporting system
in place and the uptake of a reporting system frequently declines after a period of time as shown in
industrial case studies such as in Cromie et al.,
(2012) where the use of a reporting system declined

shortly after the system was implemented, therefore
in order to achieve a consistent improvement of
safety from a reporting system; organisations will
have to implement steps to ensure that staff will
continue to make reports after it has been implemented.
The role of management in the education and
propagation of reporting has frequently been citied
within the literature. For example in Schein, (1973)
it is argued that management should set an example
for the safety behavior within the organization. In
the reporting context this involves management encouraging staff by setting the example from above
and providing endorsement and support from the
staff within the organization onto the importance of
reporting and to encourage “safe” behaviors in this
way.
Smith (1999) found that there is a major flaw” in
the idea that people will do what you want if you
positively reinforce the behaviour, it can potentially
have the opposite effect, people offered money to
complete a simple task took 50% longer than those
who were asked to do it for nothing.
There is debate within the literature regarding the
roles of mandatory and voluntary reporting systems. Cohen, (2000) provides evidence from industry that fully voluntary reporting systems actually
produce better quality reports than mandatoryreporting systems would produce and could also
serve as an indicator for the safety culture within
the organization as reports coming in a voluntary
system will be submitted as a result of a good attitude from a reporter.
As discussed within the literature and industrial
experience, the use of mandatory approaches to reporting do not appear to provide a concreate improvement in safety due to the key driving factor is
to meet a metric and not to improve safety within
the organization (Croxon, 2014), therefore the SAT
will aim to assess the various criteria that will allow
an organization to move to a non-mandatory approach to reporting. Mandatory approaches are
common within industry (Douglas et al., 2015)
however they frequently produce large amounts of
“junk” reports with little safety benefit and require
considerable staff workload to pick out the useful
report. Therefore the SAT can be used as a tool to
assist the organization in moving to a voluntary approach to reporting by assessing the cultural and
educational initiatives within the organization and
to suggest additional steps that could be rolled out.
2.5 Motivation
There are several motivational factors that can
influence the likelihood of a person to take the time
and effort to submit an accident report into the system. These motivational factors have been explored by studies such as McDonald, Corrigan,

Daly, & Cromie (2000) that developed the “Stamina model|” for human factors which included elements such as the individual and organizational
roles in human factors.
Management have to be seen to be engaged and
leading the reporting system (Kotter, 1996) by both
providing feedback to the reports and by leading
through education and other approaches such as
newsletters, safety dashboards etc. The safety culture within the organization has a critical role in the
success of a reporting system. Studies such as
Waring (2005) highlight the cultural barriers than
can exist within healthcare organisations and the
challenges these barriers can bring to the successful
uptake of a reporting system. Within hospitals there
are steep hierarchies within staff, and Waring
(2005) found that high-level staff like consultants
were highly unlikely to make reports while low level staff such as junior doctors were far more likely
to do so. Therefore there has to be considerable
steps implemented to overcome these deep-rooted
cultural concerns. A reporting system will only
generate a good level of response throughout the
organisation if there are no cultural barriers that
will negatively affect a group within the organisations confidence to report.
One potential way of improving the culture to
the point where people will make reports without
the fears of ramification would be to establish a
“Just” culture (Dekker, 2012). A just culture accepts that human error is inevitable and is a policy
where honest mistakes can be reported without any
fears of ramifications in the hope of improving
safety. However the “justness” has to be balanced
by both sides so dangerous acts of negligence also
have to be dealt with accordingly through culpability agreements etc. (Dekker, 2012; Reason, 1997).
A Culpability agreement is an agreement with
staff and management. An example can be found in
Baines Simmons (2011) and it includes the following categories.
A Culpability agreement would assist in the development of a just culture, as staff will be briefed
that genuine errors and concerns are tolerated and
unacceptable behaviours are not tolerated. As reported within Walton (2006) junior members of
staff may be reluctant to highlight errors or potential errors by a more senior member of staff, a culpability agreement that encourages non-punitive reporting to improve safety may work to overcome
this potential barrier.
A popular methodology of attracting staff to use
a reporting system is the “Behavior Based Safety”
approach. BBS emerged in the 1980s as a simple
way to encourage staff to behave in a “safe” manner
(Geller, 2005). In Lingard & Rowlinson (1997) Behavioural Based Safety is described as the analysis

of hazards associated with an employee’s job is carried out and specific behaviours representing safe
and unsafe behaviours are identified. These behaviours are then made to be the bases for the measurement of the employee’s safety performance.
Measurement can be carried using a specific instrument or by observation in the work place. Motivational activities that focus on the desired behaviour are then implemented and the monitoring is
continued for effectiveness. These activities could
exist as rewards for positive safety behaviour, such
as a cash reward for providing a report on a good
near miss (Lingard & Rowlinson, 1997). While the
intention of BBS approaches is clear they run the
risk of simply rewarding an individual behaviour
but not changing their attitude towards safety. In
fact Smith (1999) argues that positive reinforcement can cause resentment between management
and employees. Due to the nature of BBS approaches the SAT should aim to stimulate organisations to move away from these action reward approaches since BBS approaches have the risk of
simply rewarding a single “good” behaviour but fail
to encourage a reporter to develop a safer world
view and mind-set which is a key potential benefit
of a reporting system. One of the ultimate aims of
an industrial case study that is described within
Douglas et al. (2015) is to assess the effect safety
reporting has on hazard perception with the aim of
developing the self-assessment tool as a way to help
organisations sustain reporting without the need for
BBS approaches.
2.6 External Factors
The external factors criterion focuses on industrial factors outside of the organisation. These can
range from the impact of disasters elsewhere within
the industry to ligation concerns (Waring, 2005).
While these factors aren’t under the influence of the
management, they can have a profound impact on
the performance of a reporting system within industry and as a result the management should implement initiatives in order to lessen their effects.
The SAT can therefore consider the impact of a
incident, litigation etc. on the health of a reporting
system and possible initiatives that could be implemented by management in order to mitigate
some of these external effects.
3 NEXT STEPS
Now the assessment criteria for the SAT have
been identified the tool can be developed. Once the
assessment criteria have been selected the next step
will be to select the scoring system for the selfassessment tool. Due to the role reporting has with-

in safety management systems it is proposed to implement a model of safety management maturity as
the scoring system for the self-assessment tool. The
Safety Culture maturity model (McCusker, 2001)
developed by the UK health and safety executive
provides five levels of safety culture, ranging from
an emerging safety culture (Level 1) to a continually improving safety culture level 5. Each level of
the safety culture features an improvement in both
consistency and safety culture from the previous
level. While this maturity model is focused at general safety culture, it will still be suitable for the use
of reporting culture as reporting culture is widely
accepted to be a component of the wider safety culture (James Reason, 1998; Wang & Sun, 2012).
The McCusker (2001) maturity model was adapted
by A. D. Swain (1983) based on experience within
the aerospace industry. The Edwards (2005) model
consists of the following five levels of safety management
•
•
•
•
•

No or Very Little Safety Management
Just the Basics
Managing Safety Reasonably Well
Proactive safety and efficiency
Innovative on safety and efficiency

The levels from the Edwards (2005) model are
more suitable for the use in self-assessment while
still based on the accepted model for safety culture
maturity. These 5 levels from the Edwards (2005)
will be used to provide a quantitative score for each
of the criteria. This can then be used to provide a
quantitative method for assessment and using techniques such as dashboards etc. they can then be
used to help managers monitor the performance of
the reporting system and provide guidance for improvement.
3.1 Validation
The tool will be validated throughout the development lifecycle of the tool. The criteria will be
validated using an example of a deficient reporting
system scenario. A number of participants will be
asked to score the various sections based on the
mocked up case study and an inter-rater reliability
analysis will be used to assess the effectiveness of
the self-assessment tool. The Validity of the SAT
will also be monitored during the implementation
phase based on focus groups of users.
The primary area of validation will come from
case study experience in the Biopharma and Aerospace Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul industries
where action research approaches have been used to
expose areas for the SAT and to determine impact
weighting for the assessment process. The research
techniques that have been used involve semi-

structured interviews, task modelling and a bespoke
survey methodology as outlined within (Douglas et
al., 2015). These approaches will be used to validate the assessment criteria and also to determine
the score weighting that will be used to develop the
assessment report.
3.2 Tool Platform
The tool will be developed using an online web
based system which has been demonstrated to be
successful in previous research projects such as the
development of the “daily journal” safety management system as described within Strauch (2015)
where a similar platform approach was used successfully within an organisation.
Since the SAT is seen as part of an overall methodology to assess reporting it will share the platform with the SCOPE tool and it is planned to have
a concept of interoperability for the self-assessment
tool. SCOPE is a software tool developed by TCD
to allow a process to be modeling using a BPM
similar approach (Builes et al.; Douglas et al.,
2014), integrating the SAT with this platform will
assist within the overall development process.
It is intended for the tool to be used by safety
managers, therefore it is envisioned that the criteria
assessment score will be outputted to a dashboard
system that will provide a quick and easy overview
on the deficiencies within their reporting system
and will provide an easy indication on where improvements can be made. The dashboard approach
will be particularly useful in the process of ensuring
regulatory compliance which is cited within the literature as a key driver for the rollout of a reporting
system (Leveson, 2011).
4 CONCLUSION
There is currently a large amount of literature to
provide guidance on the areas that should be considered when developing a reporting system. However there is no current methodology of monitoring
the performance and compliance of a reporting system. This paper depicts the design process that will
be followed in developing this new methodology of
assessment. Once a prototype has been developed
then the assessment tool can be validated and implemented as part of the overall InnHF methodology
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